Corporate performance and the pay gap by Oliveira, Jose Ollero
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree  























 A Project carried out on the Corporate Governance course, under the supervision of: 


























Increasing disparity between executive compensation and that of the average worker 
(the pay gap) has generated a fierce debate about its causes and effects. This paper 
studies the determinants and performance effects of the pay gap through the prism of 
Tournament Incentives and the Equity Fairness Theory. Results show that the size of 
the pay gap is caused primarily by the size of the firm and by the standards of its 
industry and also by the unionization rate and whether the Chairman is also the CEO. 
The paper Concludes by showins that the pay gap has a positive effect on firm 


























New rules proposed by the American stock market regulator, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), will for the first time mandate the disclosure of the gap 
between the pay of a company’s CEO and its top executives and the median income of 
its employees. These new rules were meant to be implemented alongside the Say on Pay 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank act (2010) which established for the first time the right of 
Shareholders to vote on the compensation practices of their firms.  
However they have been fought vigorously by advocacy groups which have 
managed to delay their implementation. In November 2014 Mary Jo White, the head of 
the SEC said she hoped the rule would be implemented by the end of the year, yet as of 
February 2015 the rules have not been implemented (Sorkin, 2015). 
There are two schools of thought regarding the disparity in compensation 
between executives and employees. The Tournament theory suggests that large gaps 
will motivate employees to work hard for a chance to rise through the ranks and reap the 
rewards, while the Equity Fairness theory defends that a smaller gap will be more 
efficient as it will increase morale, cooperation and teamwork. 
In this research project I address this issue by examining two key questions; 
what factors explain the disparity between CEO pay and low level employees and what 
effect if any does this disparity has on the firm’s performance. 
The primary measure of the pay gap is the Average Executive Pay Multiple, this 
multiple is the ratio of the three year average CEO and employee pay which I calculate 
based on individual firm executive compensation disclosures to the Securities and 
Exchange Comission and industry wide data employee pay data released by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis of Statistics for a sample of 416 non-financial S&P 500 firms 
over the 2011-2013 periods. 
The analysis begins with a test for possible determinant variables for the 
Average Executive Pay Multiple under the hypothesis that the relative pay of the CEO 
versus the average worker is determined by the size, industry and risk level of the firm 
and by the relative bargaining position of both the workers and the CEO as suggested by 
prior research from Hyun et al. (2012) and Faleye et al. (2012). 
The results show that only firm size and industry are capable of determining the 
size of the pay gap with a very high degree of significance (99%), the relative 
bargaining power hypothesis is also shown to have an effect with both the unionization 
rate of the workforce and the existence of a Chairman of the Board – CEO dual role 
being significant albeit at a lower level (85%).  
Contrary to expectations other corporate governance factors such as Board size, 
the percentage of independent directors and the frequency of meetings were shown to 
have no effect on the pay gap. 
The financial leverage rate and the level of R&D spending were also shown to 
have no significant correlation with the Average Executive Pay Multiple, indicating that 
either they are not good proxies for firm risk and workforce specialization respectively 
or that these are not relevant factors in determining the pay gap. 
Next I analyze the second key question and seek to determine whether the pay 
gap has any effect on corporate performance, to do this I attempt to establish a 
correlation between the firm’s performance variables Return on Assets and Return on 
Equity and the pay gap variable Average Executive Pay Multiple Hypothesizing that 
along the lines of the Tournament Theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) there should be a 
positive correlation between the pay gap and firm performance. 
I find that there is a statistically significant positive correlation between the 
Average Executive Pay Multiple and both Return on Assets and Return on Equity, 
suggesting that at least in the case of the United States the positive effects of vertical 
pay disparity as proposed by Tournament Theory outweigh negative effects of 
inequality within firms. 
I then compare these results to those of a similar study conducted in South Korea 
by Hyun et al. (2012) where they found that vertical pay disparity had negative effects on the 
performance of Korean firms, this discrepancy leads me to posit that workers respond to 
inequality differently in different countries dependent on the societal context around them, 
workers in highly unequal countries like the USA respond positively to inequality due to having 
an unequal society as an internal reference point and workers in countries like South Korea 
respond negatively to inequality as their societal reference point clashes against what they 
experience inside a firm with large vertical pay disparities. 
These results contribute to the existing literature in two distinct ways, first it adds to 
the efforts to identify which factors are or are not responsible for causing pay disparity within 
firms and second it provides a new data point on the firm level performance effects of 
increased inequality and establishes comparisons between the differing cases of the United 
States and South Korea. 
Literature Review 
 
 The disparity between executives’ pay and workers’ compensation has been the 
subject of academic research for several decades. While researchers agree that this 
disparity has risen dramatically, from an estimated 20-1 pay ratio in 1950 to more than 
200-1in 2010 (Smith and Kuntz, 2013), the causes and effects of the pay gap are not 
completely clear. 
Firms adopt a wide variety of compensation structures, featuring different levels 
of pay disparity both among peers (horizontal disparity), and between different ranks 
within the company (vertical disparity).  Studies on pay disparity have mostly been 
focused on the disparity between peers and have found that pay disparity on a horizontal 
level is frequently detrimental to the success of the firm, generating unhappiness among 
the least compensated members and threatening organizational cohesion in groups. 
These studies have focused on a diverse range of subjects from top management 
executives (Cowherd and Levine, 1992) to university professors (Pfeffer and Langton, 
1993) and professional athletes (Bloom, 1999). 
 The theoretical framework of the studies into vertical compensation disparity has 
two distinct trains of thought. The first, which is based on economic game theory,  looks 
at compensation structures as a sequential rank order tournament, and posits that the pay 
disparity between lower level and higher level employees is a positive characteristic 
which will lead the lower level employees to exert more effort in order to try and win 
promotion to the higher ranks of the firm (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). The pay disparity is 
also justified as a tool to attract and retain top talent to the higher ranks of the company 
(Bloom and Michel, 2002). The second line of thought looks at the pay gap through the 
lens of behavioral economics and equity theory (Adams, 1965). Equity theory states that 
people expect pay to be distributed according to relative contribution and that each 
individual constantly compares their own contribution and rewards relative to their 
individual reference group. This reference group does not need to consist only of their 
peers (Kulik and Ambrose, 1992) but will also include those above and below them in 
the organization as well as members of other organizations. Individuals perceive their 
outcomes to be unjust when their ratio of input to outcomes falls out of line with their 
reference points. Through this mechanism the pay gap can generate a feeling of inequity 
within the organization. Employees may then attempt to correct this feeling of inequity 
(Cowherd and Levine, 1992). In order to do so they can alter their own internal 
perceptions or their reference points, alter their inputs to put them in line with what they 
believe their outcome justifies, or they can simply leave the firm. The last two behaviors 
are negative, from the point of view of the firm, and several studies have shown that 
they will lead to decreased productivity (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), lower product 
quality (Cowherd and Levine, 1992), as well increased turnover (Bloom and Michel 
2002). 
 The empirical study of executive-employee pay disparity has been hampered by 
lack of available data; the few studies that have attempted to quantify the performance 
effect of vertical pay disparity have given mixed results and have operated with limited 
data, most of them restricted to analyzing a subsection of the executive suite and the 
CEO rather than looking at the company as a whole. Examples of such studies are 
Conyon et al. (2001), Heyman (2005), Kale et al. (2009), all of which support the 
performance enhancing effects of pay gaps. Other studies (Siegel and Hambrick 2005; 
Bebchuk et al. 2011) find empirical evidence that pay compression in the executive 
suite increases firm performance. 
 The most comprehensive study of the determinants of the executive pay multiple 
over the average worker and its effect on performance came from the Republic of Korea 
by Hyun et al. (2012)  where stock exchange rules mandate the disclosure of  the average 
worker’s compensation and give researchers access to a unique data set. Utilizing 
annual report disclosures from 2000 to 2009, the authors find  a statistically significant 
negative correlation between the executive pay multiple and the operating and stock 
return performance of a firm. They also find that the pay gap is positively correlated 
with the size of the firm and with a lack of oversight from the board of directors. Finally, 
the authors find that the pay gap varies greatly between different industries and that it is 
negatively correlated with worker union membership, CEO tenure, employee tenure and 
the probability of promotion for the companies Vice Presidents. 
 Despite the apparent strengths of this study it may not be possible to generalize 
their findings to other corporate environments, due to the particular nature of South 
Korean society. South Korea is a highly egalitarian society (second lowest income 
inequality in the G-20 as measure by the Gini Coeficient, only behind Germany, Quandl 
2014) which places a lot of pressure on executive compensation (average pay gap in 
2010 is of 48-1 for companies quoted in the South Korean stock market) preventing the 
kind of extreme disparities that you find in many other countries like the USA. 
 Notwithstanding the lack of disclosure from American firms there are two recent 
studies that have tried to empirically test the effects of the pay gap. 
The first analyzes  bank holding companies (Crawford et al. 2014), which are 
mandated by law to disclose all worker compensation since 1995, as this allows for the 
estimation of averages; the second   is based on data voluntarily released from S&P 
1500 firms  ( Faleye et al. 2012). Faleye et al. (2012) finds that less than 10% of all 
firms quoted in the S&P1500 disclose any information about employee pay. From that 
limited and self-selecting sample they find evidence that the pay gap is largely 
explained by the relative bargaining power of executives versus employees. In 
companies with strong boards executives find it harder to excessively reward 
themselves, while in companies with strong unions and highly skilled workers 
employees are able to drive up the price of their labour. This is broadly in line with the 
findings of the Korean study. However, in  the American sample the authors do not find 
any evidence of a negative impact on corporate performance arising from the pay gap. 
This is contrary to what was found by Hyun et al. (2012) The impact of unionization 
rates is a possible cause for this discrepancy, as Faleye et al. (2012) find that they are a 
significant drag on performance while Hyun et al. (2012) do not find a correlation 
between the unionization rates of South Korean workers and the performance of South 
Korean firms. 
 The  recent study by Crawford et al. (2014) finds a concave relationship between 
performance and the pay gap. Thus, up to a point firms benefit from the tournament 
incentives that vertical pay disparity provides, but at extreme levels firms start to 
perform worse. These firms are also taking significantly greater risks and face greater 
dissent in Say on Pay votes from shareholders. They also find that the median pay gap is 
lower than the average for bank holding companies and those bank holding companies 
which are not quoted in the S&P1500 have a median pay gap of only 7.5-1 as opposed 
to 34-1 for S&P1500 bank holding companies. This is in line with previous findings, 




Executive compensation practices in the USA have changed dramatically since the end 
of World War 2. This increase began in the mid 1970’s, which mark the end of the great 
compression, an era that began after WW2 and during which relative income between 
top, mid, and lower ranking workers remained relatively stable. Yearly increases for 
executive compensation went from 3.1% in the 1970’s, to 5.6% in the 1980’s, to 18.5% 
in the 1990’s ( Frydman and Saks, 2005). This change was fueled primarily by the 
decrease in top marginal tax rates and by the adoption of incentive pay, according to the 
landmark Harvard Business Review article by Jensen and Murphy (1990): 
 
“The compensation of top executives is virtually independent of performance. On 
average, corporate America pays its most important leaders like bureaucrats. Is it any 
wonder then that so many CEOs act like bureaucrats rather than the value-maximizing 
entrepreneurs companies need to enhance their standing in world markets?” 
 
 Incentive pay, mostly in the form of stock options but also in salary bonuses and 
Long Term Incentive Plans, became an increasingly large share of total compensation 
for executives during the following decades. It came under increased scrutiny after the 
two market crashes of the 2000’s: first with Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) and more recently 
with Dodd-Frank (2010). Both initiatives mandate greater transparency and oversight 
over the level and structure of executive compensation. 
 Disclosure laws mandate that every firm quoted in capital markets must include 
in its annual reports details on all compensation to its CEO and its top 5 highest earning 
executives. Say on Pay provisions in Dodd-Frank mandate that executive compensation 
be put up for a (non-binding) shareholder vote, and not simply approved by the board of 
directors’ compensation committee.  
 In contrast, worker compensation practices are subject to very little transparency, 
Dodd-Frank attempted to remedy this problem by mandating disclosure of the median 
workers wage and of the ratio between the median worker compensation and that of its 
CEO executives under Section 953(b).  
However despite being first proposed by the SEC on September 2013, it has yet 
to be implemented.  
The opposition comes from corporations, who argue that the rule only intends to 
shame them over their enormous pay gaps and more practical concerns as to how 
exactly to calculate the median wage of the workers for large multinational corporations, 
have kept the proposal from being put into practice (Sorkin, 2015). Therefore, all 




 Given the data availability constraints the sample will only include S&P500 
companies from the years 2013, 2012 and 2011. Because of executive compensation 
disclosure laws all executive compensation data for all S&P500 companies is available 
through the Bloomberg database and Compustat, as well as key financial indicators such 
as Return on Assets (RoA) which we will use to assess corporate performance. 
 Financial firms are excluded from the sample, due to differences in the way 
these firms are regulated, which alter accounting performance metrics such as RoA. 
With these restrictions the final corporate sample includes 416 S&P500 firms, and 
1,228 firm years, 
 Due to the lack of disclosure on worker pay a proxy estimate must be used to 
calculate the pay gap of each corporation. This proxy is calculated from industry 
specific data which gives us the closest possible approximation of the average worker 
compensation of each firm. Using the Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income 
and Products database we take the yearly average wages per full time worker equivalent 
for a given industry and ponder it by the industry benefits to wages multiplier, which 
equals the average yearly compensation per worker for a given industry. 
 
                   
                           
                  
 
 
The industry of each company  is determined using the Bloomberg Industry 
Classification System (based on the firm’s revenue sources) and matching it to the 
North American Industry Classification System, which the Bureau for Economic 




Based on previous studies in South Korea and the United States from Hyun, 
Kang et al. (2012) and Faleye et al. (2012) I specify a model which will allow me to 
discern the determinants and the performance effects of vertical pay disparity. Below is 
a description of the vertical pay disparity proxy as well for each of the key variables 
Average Executive Pay Multiple 
Calculated as the ratio of the three year average executive and worker 
compensation for each of the 416 non-financial firms for which data is available, this is 
the proxy for vertical pay disparity. 
 
Average CEO Compensation 
Calculated as the three year average of CEO compensation for 416 S&P 500 
firms taken from 1228 samples in the years 2011-2013, the sample includes all forms of 
compensation including bonuses, stock options and all the expected value of all deferred 
compensation agreements. (The Source is the COMPUSTAT’s EXECUCOMP 
database, , units in thousands of dollars). 
 
Average Employee Compensation 
Calculated as the three year average of yearly compensation per worker for 416 
S&P firms. (The source is the Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and 
Products, units in thousands of dollars). 
 
Corporate Governance 
Research from Hyun, et al. (2012) and Faleye et al. (2012) indicates that 
corporate governance should have a significant impact on the ability of the CEO to 
extract greater compensation from shareholders and should therefore be a significant 
factor on the size of the vertical pay disparity where firms with weaker corporate 
governance exhibit a larger Average Executive Pay Multiple. This model will look at 
the impact that corporate governance has on the Average executive pay multiple 
through five different corporate governance indicators 
 
Board Size 
Calculated as the three year average Board of Directors size for 416 S&P 500 
firms from 2011 to 2013. (The Source is the Spencer Stuart Board Index.) This variable 
is expected to be negatively correlated with the Average Executive Pay Multiple as a 
larger board should make it more difficult for the CEO to exert undue influence on the 
board a whole. 
 
Percentage of Independent Directors 
Calculated as the average percentage of independent directors in each Board of 
Directors for 416 S&P 500 firms over 2011-2014. (The Source is the Spencer Stuart 
Board Index.) This variable is expected to be negatively correlated with the Average 
Executive Pay Multiple as a greater percentage of directors with no relation to the firm 
should make the board more objective relative to the CEO and their compensation. 
 
Meetings per year 
Calculated as the average number of times per year the Boards of Directors of 
416 S&P500 firms have met during the three year period 2011-2013. (The Source is the 
Spencer Stuart Board Index.) This variable is expected to be negatively correlated with 
the Average Executive Pay Multiple as a higher number of meetings per year is 
indicative of an active Board making it less likely that the CEO could exert undue 
influence through Board negligence. 
 
Chairman-CEO 
A dummy variable indicating whether the CEO is also the Chairman of the 
Board. (The source is the Spencer Stuart Board Index.) This variable is expected to be 
positively correlated with the Average Executive Pay Multiple as a Chairman-CEO will 
have greater influence on other board members and greater ability to set his own 
compensation level. 
 
Company and Workforce characteristics 
The characteristics of the firm itself and its workforce are have been shown by 
both Hyun, et al. (2012) and Faleye et al. (2012) to be significant in determining the 
disparity between worker and CEO compensation. Smaller companies which operate in 
industries which require a more specialized workforce or who have a higher 
unionization rate should have a lower Average Executive Pay Multiple and companies 
which can replace workers easily and have larger sizes are expected to have larger pay 
disparities. Below are five variables which serve as proxies for the size, industry and 
workforce effects on the Executive Pay Multiple. 
 
Average Workforce Unionization Rate 
Calculated as the average percentage of the workforce which belongs to a union, 
estimate based on industry wide data taken over a three year period 2011-2013. (The 
Source is the Bureau of Labor Statistics.) This variable is expected to be correlated with 
a lower Executive Pay Multiple as a unionized workforce should have greater 
bargaining power leading to higher wages relative to the CEO. 
 
Average Yearly R&D Spending 
Calculated as the three year average of R&D Spending for each of 416 S&P 500 
companies during the years 2011-2013. (The source is COMPUSTAT’s Financial 
Statements Database, , units in thousands of dollars) This variable serves as a proxy for 
the level of education and ease of replacement for a given companies workforce as firms 
with higher R&D spending require highly skilled employees which are more highly 
educated and harder to replace. 
 
Average Firm size  
Calculated as the three year average of Revenue for each of 416 S&P 500 firms. 
(The source is COMPUSTAT’s Financial Statements Database, units in thousands of 
dollars) This variable is expected to be positively correlated with the Executive Pay 
Multiple as a larger company is more complicated to manage and requires a better CEO 
which according to tournament theory will lead to greater compensation for the top in 
order to both incentivize talented lower ranking employees to climb up the ladder and 
attract talented CEO’s from other firms. 
 
Average Industry Pay Multiple 
Calculated as the average Executive Pay Multiple for each of each industry that 
the 416 S&P500 companies belong to over the 2011-2013 period. This variable should 
have a very strong effect as each individual industry has different supply and demand 
constraints that are common to all companies in that industry and which will greatly 
influence the size of the Executive Pay Multiple all other things equal. 
 
Company Leverage 
Calculated as the three year average of Long term debt divided by Total Assets 
for each of the 416 individual companies of the S&P 500 that are part of the sample. 
(The Source is COMPUSTAT’s Annual Financial Statements Database.) The effect this 
variable has on the Executive Pay Multiple is uncertain, higher leverage means higher 
risk which can have effects on both the workforce and CEO compensation as they have 
to be adjusted to match that risk. Both the workforce and the CEO will demand more 
compensation in order to make up for the risk of bankruptcy and the harm it will cause 
them as well as the additional challenge of managing a highly leveraged company. 
 
Return on Assets 
Calculated as the three year average of the ratio of Operating Income to total 
Assets for each of the 416 individual S&P500 firms that are part of the sample. (The 
source is COMPUSTAT’s Annual Financial Statements Database.) This variable is a 
measure of the firm’s performance and the expected correlation of this variable to the 
Executive Pay Multiple is unknown. According to Tournament theory the correlation 
should be positive as strong tournament incentives will lead to firms with a large 
Executive Pay Multiple performing better than other firms; however the Equity Fairness 
theory predicts that a high Executive Pay Multiple will lead to discontent and lower 
efficiency from the employees resulting in a negative correlation with Average Return 
on Assets. 
 
Return on Equity  
Calculated as the three year average of the ratio of Operating Income to 
Shareholders’ Equity for each of the 416 individual S&P500 firms that are part of the 
sample. (The source is COMPUSTAT’s Annual Financial Statements Database.) This 
variable measures the firm’s performance and like Average Return on Assets its 




Table 1 Shows the summary statistics of the key variables for Compensation, 
Corporate governance and Company and workforce characteristics. The Average 
Executive Pay multiple is not a normal distribution, it has a positive skew of 3.691 and 
a very high standard deviation of 165.51, larger than the median value of just 157.456 
indicating that the Average Executive Pay Multiple has a long tail of companies with 
very high pay gaps that contribute significantly to skewing the distribution, these 
companies are Apple INC, with the highest multiple of 1752.429 and Oracle Cop and 
CBS Corp which have multiples of over 1000 each, These are also the three firms with 
the most well compensated CEO’s over the 3 year period. 
There is also a lot of variation in the board composition with companies having 
as many as 24 directors or as few as 5, with a median size of 11. Of those 11 members 
of median board a full 87.5% are independent, indicating a very high degree of 
independence from the boards, much higher than you can find in the case of South 
Korea where the median board has 6.4 members and only 35% of whom are 
independent (Hyun et al. 2012). In our sample 34.4% of those boards have a Chairman-
CEO and half of them meet at least seven times per year. 
There is a low degree of unionization among workers in the 416 S&P 500 firms 
in the sample, workers in these companies have a median unionization rate of just 
10.5%, only a little more than one third of the unionization rate of South Korean firms 
which stands at 29.5% (Hyun et al. 2012) an outcome broadly in line with Faleye et al. 
(2012). 
Average Industry pay multiple statistics broadly reflect the individual Average 
Executive Pay Multiple, indicating that industry standards are key in understanding the 
pay gap. 
 
Table 1 - Descriptive statistics for Compensation, Corporate Governance and Company and Workforce Variables 
Variable  Mean Median St_Dev Skewness Minimum Maximum Count 
Compensation               
Average Executive Pay Multiple 195.525 157.457 165.51 3.691 12.268 1,762.43 416 
Average CEO comp 10,912 9,179 9,599 6.416 1,319 128,808 416 
Average employee comp 61.328 59.935 19.491 0.963 25.346 160.515 416 
Corporate Governance               
Board size 10.601 11 2.03 0.776 5 24 416 
Independent Directors 8.875 9 2.06 0.164 4 18 416 
independent director percentage 0.835 0.875 0.096 -1.455 0.412 0.941 416 
Meetings per year 7.572 7 2.935 1.489 4 21 416 
Chairman-CEO 0.344 0 0.476 0.66 0 1 416 
Company and Workforce                
Unionized worker % 0.117 0.105 0.093 3.906 0.016 0.82 416 
Average R&D spending 982,535 371,647 1,568,092 2.594 1,109 8,124,000 416 
Average Firm Size 21,249,213 8,712,900 42,123,933 6.425 613,700 476,294,000 416 
Average Industry pay multiple 193.344 165.292 106.717 1.796 30.377 655.872 416 
Leverage 0.478 0.41 0.219 0.307 0.1 0.89 416 
ROA 0.065 0.057 0.063 0.758 -0.237 0.361 416 





In order to test the determinants of the pay gap I estimate regressions of the 
natural log of the Executive Pay Multiple on all the determinant variables. The 
regression equation is built similarly to the pay gap determinant regression performed 
by Hyun et al. (2012) on South Korean firm to try and obtain comparable results. 
 
                                
                               
                                                  
                                                         
                                                
                                        
 
The results obtained in Table 2 show that the executive pay multiple is positively 
correlated with firm size, board size, meetings per year, Whether the chairman is the 
CEO, the percentage of independent directors and the Average industry pay multiple. 
We see as well that the executive pay multiple is negatively correlated with Average 
Yearly R&D Spending, the worker unionization rate as well as the company leverage. 
 
Table 2 - Regression Estimating the determinants of theAverage Executive Pay multiple 
Independent Variables Coeficient P-Value 
Constant -1.725* 0.001 
ln Average Yearly R&D Spending -0.016 0.334 
Average Workforce Unionization Rate -0.441**** 0.125 
ln Average Firm size  0.151* 0 
ln Board Size 0.027 0.851 
ln Meetings per year 0.031 0.67 
Chairman-CEO 0.078**** 0.141 
Percentage of Independent Directors 0.153 0.578 
Company Leverage -0.187 0.178 
ln Average Industry Pay Multiple 0.843* 0 
Adjusted R Square 0.491   
Count 416   
 
Of these results however only two variable correlations can be said to be 
significant with a very high degree of certainty (greater than 99%), those are the 
positive correlations of the Average Executive Pay multiple and the Average firm size 
and industry multiple, of the remaining variables only the Average Workforce 
Unionization Rate and the Chairman-CEO have a reasonable degree of statistical 
significance (greater than 85%). The remaining variables have a P-value greater than 
0.15 and are therefore statistically insignificant. 
The Model as a whole has an Adjusted R Square of 0.491 meaning that the 
independent variables explain 49.1% of the total variability of the response data around 
the mean, this explanatory power comes from the four variables mentioned above that 
are statistically significant. 
These Results are consistent with the findings of Hyun et al. (2012) and Faleye 
et al. (2012) that show that the size of the firm is one of the primary determinants of the 
vertical pay disparity and follows the line of Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) which 
shows that firm size is the greatest determinant of CEO compensation. Larger firms 
have higher CEO compensation in order to try and attract higher quality executives 
from smaller firms. 
As expected the Executive Pay Multiple is heavily correlated with the Industry 
Pay Multiple, both worker and CEO compensation are similar within industries leading 
to similar pay gaps. This is consistent with the expectations from previous studies as 
well as with the Equity Fairness theory where people’s expectations of what they should 
earn is constrained by their peers, meaning that not only will lower level workers 
demand similar compensation to other low level workers in that industry but the CEO, 
who has the greatest bargaining power of anyone at the firm, will do so as well. 
Table 2 also shows that Average Unionization Rate is a major drag on the size of 
the Average Executive Pay Multiple, the increase in the bargaining position of the 
workers vis-à-vis the corporation leads to higher average wages and pressure from the 
unions also impacts the CEO’s ability to make wage demands (Olubunmi Faleye et al. 
2012). The major negative impact of the Unionization Rate on the vertical pay disparity 
of corporation’s sugests that policies to increase the unionization rate can be effective in 
fighting growing inequality. 
The dual role of Chairman-CEO has long been under fire for the perceived 
conflict of interest and the undermining of checks and balances within the firm (Noam 
Noke, 2012, here we see evidence that there is indeed a cost to the Dual role, having a 
single individual occupying the seat of the Chairman and the CEO is a statistically 
significant determinant of the Average Executive Pay Multiple. Having the CEO as 
Chairman puts the CEO in a better bargaining position versus the compensation 
committee and the shareholders enhancing the CEO’s ability to extract income gains 
from his position and making it harder for the board to stay independent (Olubunmi 
Faleye et al. 2012). This makes yet another strong case for splitting the Chairman-CEO 
role to create a more independent board and fight market failure in the form of a board 
of directors captured by the CEO. 
 
In order to test the performance effects of the pay gap I estimate regressions of 
Return on Assets and the Return on Equity on the Executive Pay Multiple as well as all 
the other company characteristics. 
 
                                                   
                                                  
                                        
                                        
 
In Table 3 Below we see the results of these regressions; they show a small but 
statistically significant positive correlation between ROA and ROE and the Average 
Executive Pay Multiple (greater than 95% and 90% respectively). This is consistent 
with the Tournament Hypothesis and with the findings of Faleye et al, (2012), which 
showed that for his self-selecting sample of American firms there was a positive 





Table 3 -  Regression estimating the performance effects of the Average Executive Pay Multiple 
Variables ROA ROE  
  coeficient P-Value coeficient P-Value 
Constant -0.143* 0.001 -0.212* 0.001 
Ln Average Executive Pay Multiple 0.028* 0.036 0.031** 0.052 
ln Average Firm size  0.005*** 0.113 0.006**** 0.15 
Company Leverage 0.009 0.383 0.011 0.774 
ln Average Industry Pay Multiple -0.022* 0.001 -0.093* 0.003 
Adjusted R Square 0.656   0.637   
Count 416   416   
 
Assuming that these results are broadly accurate we can see a clear difference in 
the effects of the pay gap between the Korean corporations and the American 
corporations. 
In Korea, a society with low inequality, companies with more unequal pay 
distributions are hindered by their pay practices according to Hyun et al. (2012) however 
in America the effects of the pay gap appear to be positive. This indicates that there are 
significant differences in the worker preferences and attitudes between South Korea and 
the USA and highlights the role of cultural as well as psychological factors in the 
performance of firms especially between different societies. 
It also raises the possibility that the pay gap may simply be a symptom of wider 
societal inequality and more unequal societies condition workers into accepting greater 
inequality in their firms by impacting the reference points that these workers use for 
comparison. Being confronted with a level of vertical pay disparity that is common in 
American firms would greatly upset South Korean workers potentially leading to 
disparity reducing actions like forming a union or perhaps go on strike which would 
harm firm performance, something which does not happen often in the United States. 
Tackling the issue of inequality would then be better off done outside of the firm 
by changing people’s expectations and reference points for example via highly 





Inequality has become the major socio-economic issue of today and the relative 
compensation of top executives versus the average worker has been thrust into the 
political spotlight. New measures proposed by the SEC that will force companies to 
officially disclose their pay gap are being adamantly opposed by major US corporations 
which argue that these disclosures are useless and that any measure that will try to 
actively suppress the pay ratio is harmful to companies.  
Academic Literature is divided on the topic, evidence suggests that firms can 
both benefit and be harmed by vertical pay disparity depending on the contextual 
reactions of the employees, either by becoming incentivized via tournament incentives, 
or demoralized through a sense of inequity and unfairness. 
This paper tries to shed some clarity on the issue by gathering and analyzing 
data from the firms current mandatory disclosures combined with industry wide data on 
the vertical pay differential between the average employee and the CEO of non-
financial firms from the S&P 500 index. 
In addition to compensation data a series of corporate governance metrics 
including the number of board members, their independence, the frequency of their 
meetings and whether or not the Chairman is also the CEO are analyzed to determine to 
what extent corporate governance contributes to the pay gap. 
Workforce and corporation characteristics such as the Unionization Rate, the 
firm size, the financial leverage and the R&D spending of the firm are also used to 
attempt to discern causal effects on the pay gap. 
The results indicate that the pay gap in the United States is primarily caused by 
the size of the firms as well as by the relative bargaining power of the CEO and the 
employees. Unionized employees bring down the pay disparities within a firm and a 
Chairman-CEO increases them through a stronger bargaining position. 
The pay gap is also heavily impacted by the size of the industry specific 
multiplier. 
This paper also finds a small but positive relationship between performance and 
the pay gap in, in contrast to the situation in South Korea where the pay gap leads to a 
significantly lower performance. Inequality within firms appears to have significantly 
different effects depending on societal environments, firms in societies with high 
inequality experience positive effects from a large executive pay multiple and firms in 
societies with low inequality experience the opposite. 
More data points are needed to corroborate this theory and a more conclusive 
analysis of this issue can only be done through widespread access to firm specific 
employee compensation data which firms do not want to disclose, the study conducted 
in South Korea suggested that these disclosures would lead to harmful revelations 
however a picture is beginning to emerge and at least in the United States it is not 
necessarily negative towards the impact of inequality in firms. 
This paper adds to that picture showing that the relationship between the 
executive pay multiple and the firms’ performance is positive and that the tournament 
incentive effect may dominate when it comes to vertical pay disparity in American 
corporations. 
A suggestion for future research is to look within individual industries and see 
for which industries the positive performance effects of the pay gap hold and discover if 
there are differences in the performance effects of the pay gap for firms in industries 
with a lower average vertical pay disparity. 
The public is increasingly calling for action on income inequality, understanding 
how compensation inequality affects the behavior and incentives of employees and the 
outcomes of corporations is important if good corporate and political policies are to be 
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